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This article introduces and discusses Lydia Jaeger’s dialogue with and critical evaluation of a few 
aspects of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. From her critical realist position, Jaeger evaluates Dooyeweerd’s 
rejection of the ‘Logos-speculation’ and his definitions of truth. As he deviates from the Christian 
epistemological tradition referring to the ‘correspondence between thought and reality’, Jaeger 
argues that he fails to connect subject and object sufficiently. I argue that in Dooyeweerd’s ontology 
subject and object are thoroughly interwoven by the law-order. I also question Jaeger’s critique 
that, in his epistemology, Dooyeweerd doesn’t make sufficient use of biblical resources and is too 
inclined towards idealism. I suggest that Jaeger’s contentions could be re-considered and that a 
more positive approach to reformational philosophy may open new avenues for her own research.
Key words: Christian philosophy and scholarship, Lydia Jaeger, Herman Dooyeweerd, Critical 
realism, Logos doctrine/speculation, Correspondence theory of truth, Reformational and 
Scholastic attitudes in philosophy
Hierdie artikel is ‘n inleiding in, en bespreking van Lydia Jaeger se dialoog met, en kritiese 
evaluering van enkele aspekte van Dooyeweerd se filosofie. Jeager evalueer Dooyeweer se 
verwerping van die ‘Logos-spekulasie’ en sy definisies van waarheid vanuit haar krities-realistiese 
posisie. Omdat hy van die christelik epistemologiese tradisie afwyk, laasgenoemde verwysende 
na die ‘korrespondensie tussen denke en realiteit’, argumenteer Jaeger dat hy nie daarin slaag 
om subjek en objek genoegsaam met mekaar te verbind nie. Ek argumenteer dat Dooyeweerd 
se epistemologie subjek en objek deeglik met mekaar verweef deur middel van die wetsorde. Ek 
bespreek ook Jaeger se bewerings dat, in sy filosofie, Dooyeweerd nie genoegsaam gebruik maak 
van bybelse bronne nie en dat hy geneig is tot idealisme. Ek suggereer dat Jaeger se bewerings 
herbedink behoort te word en dat ‘n meer positiewe benadering tot Reformatoriese filosofie nuwe 
weë ook vir haar eie navorsing kan oopmaak.
Sleutelwoorde: Christelike filosofie, Lydia Jaeger, Herman Dooyeweerd, Kritiese realisme, 
Logosleer/-spekulasie, Korrespondensie waarheidsteorie, Reformatoriese en Skolastiese 
benaderings tot die filosofie





Lydia Jaeger is an Evangelical philosopher of science, with 
specialisations in theology, philosophy and physics. She is a 
prolific author who writes in several languages and has been 
associated with several universities in Germany, France and 
England. She is at present also Dean of the Biblical Institute 
of Nogent-sur-Marne, near Paris. As I regard myself too 
as an Evangelical and I lecture in philosophy of science, I 
was immediately interested in her work. We are both well-
acquainted with the neo-Calvinist1 tradition of Kuyper, 
Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, Van Til (in South Africa also Stoker, 
in France also Lecerf). While I lean more on the Dooyeweerdian 
side, I had the impression that she leans more on the Van 
Tilian side. But then she recently clarified that, as far as she is 
concerned, she ‘takes inspiration from both’ these giants of the 
Kuyperian tradition.2 
Given this background, when I came across an essay3 of hers 
dedicated to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, I was somehow surprised 
to find that it harbours a rather radical critique of Dooyeweerd’s 
position. In that text, in fact, she advances several objections 
against Dooyeweerd’s epistemology and ontology. These 
objections are rather fundamental and seem to leave little hope 
for further dialogue. They seem to parallel Blocher’s trenchant 
verdict on several aspects of Dooyeweerd’s epistemology: ‘I 
have had to conclude that he is wrong’ (Blocher, 2010:227). 
Nevertheless, Jaeger begins her essay by saying that her 
critique is to be understood as a sign of interest in Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy and concludes by pointing out several areas of 
agreement between herself and Dooyeweerd (2012:309-310). I 
am therefore encouraged to think that my present ‘ecumenical’ 
exercise will not be perceived as irrelevant.
In this article, I will reply to Jaeger’s essay by trying to argue 
that her contentions against the Dutch-reformed philosopher 
should be re-considered. On the one hand, in my opinion, 
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is closer than she may think to 
several themes, concerns and results that she pursues and 
develops in her own writings. On the other hand I will also 
deliver a few critiques of Jaeger’s position, with the purpose 
of suggesting that a reformational alternative might fit 
better with a/her Christian approach. In the next section, 
however, the first step is to introduce her epistemological 
convictions and her critiques of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. 
1 In this article I will use the term ‘neo-Calvinist’ as including all 
scholars and circles in the Kuyperian tradition, and therefore as a 
synonym of ‘Kuyperian’. I will reserve the adjective ‘reformational’ to 
refer to the specific school of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven.
2  Personal communication, 20 September 2013.
3  The text is in French and all translations appearing in this article are 
mine. In English, the title of Jaeger’s (2012:299-310) essay is: ‘Herman 
Dooyeweerd, the Logos-speculation and the truth’. The essay is part 
of a collection, edited by Alain Nisus, by the title The love of wisdom: 
[essays in] homage to Henri Blocher. 
Jaeger’s theses and contentions
Jaeger’s epistemological position is rooted in the Christian 
tradition, in what she calls the ‘traditional Christian theory of 
knowledge’ (Jaeger, 2012:303). Her conception is based on the 
idea of creation and on the doctrine of the Logos, the second 
person of the Trinity. According to Jaeger, this doctrine excludes 
all nominalist and idealist views and invites to a (moderate) 
form of realism. Jaeger’s epistemology, therefore, is a realist 
one, yet she does not opt for naive realism. Her conception, 
quite popular in Christian circles, can be defined as critical 
realism. From that point of view, the object of knowledge is not 
isolated from the knowing subject: the two are ‘tuned’ to each 
other. 
The Logos doctrine allows overcoming a traditional problem 
of classical realism, the problem of connecting the subject and 
the object. It is not always clear, in fact, that or how the two 
should be related to each other, in other words why/how the 
object should be open to human knowledge. On this junction 
the doctrine of the Logos plays an essential role. The human 
subject, created in God’s image, can recognize in the object 
a creature that is known by the Logos. As she writes: ‘the 
correspondence between (...) knowing person and world to be 
known is granted by the double presence of the Logos’ (Ibid: 
303). The Logos is ‘present’ to both of them.
The knowing subject too has a double connection to the Logos: 
true knowledge is given not only by the correspondence 
between thought and object but also between thought and 
Thought (human and divine thought – Ibid: 308-309). There 
are no ‘brute facts’ in the cosmos, they are always pre-known 
and pre-interpreted by the Creator. Human thinking is veridical 
when it corresponds to divine thought. As Van Til used to say, it 
is a matter of ‘thinking God’s thoughts after Him’.
 The Logos is the ordering principle of the universe, from which 
all things derive. The Bible, says Jaeger, affirms this truth in 
the Prologue of the Gospel of John. Several Greek philosophers 
recognised the Logos as the rational order of the cosmos. 
Christians should not shy away from this recognition: ‘all truth 
is God’s truth’, even when it is proclaimed by pagans (Ibid: 307). 
Conversely, when John wrote about the Logos (in the Prologue 
to his Gospel), he knew that the idea was already present in the 
Greek world and that it had connotations that were not exactly 
biblical. Nevertheless, his Prologue creates a bridge between 
the Old Testament and Greek culture (Ibid: 305).
These are Jaeger’s theses briefly summarized. Her critiques 
against Dooyeweerd’s philosophy are the following.
1. Dooyeweerd rejects what he calls the ‘Logos-speculation’ 
on the basis that there are very unsatisfactory versions 
of the doctrine of the Logos (e.g. in Clement, Origen, 
Tertullian). Yet the cost of this rejection is that he 
cannot properly connect the subject to the object. In 
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy the Logos is substituted 
by the (naive experience of the) self (Ibid: 303). 
The previous allegation is stated from a different angle:




2. Dooyeweerd’s conception of the truth is not based 
on the classical correspondence between thought 
and reality, or thought and facts (adequatio rei et 
intellectus). As a consequence, his epistemology does 
not provide a sufficiently direct contact between 
‘the human spirit and the world’ (Ibid: 308). One 
 should also consider two other critiques.
3. Dooyeweerd’s epistemology does not stem from and is not 
the result of an intense interaction with the biblical text 
(Ibid: 307-308). 
4. His position results in a certain dose of idealism: he is too 
inclined towards Kant and Husserl (Ibid: 310). 
Jaeger’s reflections place her in an ideal dialogue with 
Dooyeweerd, a dialogue on the foundations of Christian 
philosophy with crucial implications for the nature of Christian 
scholarship. In the following section we are going to analyse 
the first allegation.
Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the Logos-speculation
Jaeger is supported in her (moderate realist) position by several 
reformed giants of the past, not only Kuyper but also Bavink 
and Woltjer. It might be objected, however, that Jaeger finds 
herself also in the company of Thomas Aquinas and other 
Scholastic authors. In addition, the reformed theologian 
Geerhardus Vos (1980:478-484) expressed clear reservations 
concerning critical realism and, even more interesting, 
Van Til himself articulated a few perplexities concerning 
the use of the Logos doctrine in Bavink’s epistemology 
(Van Til, 1974:94-95). To complicate the picture even further, 
one might add that both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven did 
initially accept a form of critical realism similar to Kuyper’s and 
equally informed by ‘trinitarian’ themes (cf. Tol, 2011:192-199). 
Only at a later stage they found it un-satisfactory and decided to 
opt for an alternative (i.e. reformational) solution.
But apart from the supporters and detractors of critical realism 
and the Logos doctrine, Jaeger recognizes that Dooyeweerd’s 
critique of the ‘Logos speculation’ is profound. After examining 
the Greek conceptions of the Logos (e.g. Philo and Plotinus – 
Dooyeweerd, 2012:68-74) he takes into account several Christian 
versions of the doctrine (Ibid: 74-80) and he shows that they all 
contain important flaws (Ibid: 82 ff.). Dooyeweerd’s concerns are 
not only theological, they proceed on philosophical grounds. 
The major problem that he mentions is that ‘the Logos-theory 
logicizes the creation order’ (in other words absolutizes the 
rational modality - Ibid: 83 ff.). 
Jaeger is prepared to admit (with Van Til, 1971:441) that the pre-
Nicean versions of the Logos-doctrine are not satisfactory from 
a theological point of view. In fact, they reduce the Logos to 
a kind of ‘inferior’ deity. But she sounds slightly surprised by 
the fact that ‘Dooyeweerd’s critique is extended to Augustine as 
well’ (Jaeger, 2012:304, 306). Interestingly, at this junction Jaeger 
does not respond to Dooyeweerd’s criticism of Augustine’s 
(post-Nicean) Logos-theory, she just assumes that an acceptable 
version of the doctrine must exist. Unfortunately, she does not 
clearly indicate which (whose) version of the doctrine might be 
acceptable, and I think this weakens her argumentation to an 
extent. 
The only clue she provides on this issue is that, in a proper 
version of the Logos-doctrine, the correspondence between 
thought and fact should be integrated by the correspondence 
between thought and Thought (human and divine thought, 
Ibid: 308-309). But how does the latter make the “contact” 
between the knower and the object of knowledge more 
direct? After all, the thought-Thought correspondence seems 
to be a move away from the object. In this context Jaeger 
(Ibid: 309, fn. 32) quotes Auguste Lecerf, but in her own 
paraphrase of his position Lecerf refers to the necessity 
of understanding the “structure” (the law) of/for created 
reality, not divine thought. Lecerf seems rather to support 
a reformational understanding of these issues (which will be 
discussed below). Finally, she does not respond to the crucial 
issue of the logicization of the created order (I will return on 
this issue below). 
Perhaps feeling that the best defence is attack, Jaeger proceeds 
to argue that, in his philosophy, Dooyeweerd consciously 
replaces the Logos with the naive experience of the self. 
She writes that ‘the naive experience of the supra-temporal 
self plays in Dooyeweerd the role traditionally attributed 
to the Logos in the classical Christian theory of knowledge’ 
(Jaeger, 2012:303). The idea was not immediately clear to me, 
but I think she means the following. While in critical realism the 
Logos connects subject and object, in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy 
a similar connection is envisaged in his conception of naive 
(or pre-scientific) experience. There the subject is placed in 
direct contact with objects, events and processes: in this sense 
naive experience plays the role of the Logos in connecting 
object and subject. This direct contact is acceptable to Jaeger, 
with the only regret that the Logos is replaced by the self.
When it comes to theoretical thought, the situation is definitely 
worse: there Dooyeweerd introduces an antithesis, an 
opposition between subject and object. True, the antithesis is 
followed by a synthesis, but the theoretical attitude of thought 
is characterised by an antithesis. In addition, the self is again the 
‘hidden player’ making possible (after a theoretical antithesis is 
intentionally set up) the synthesis between the logical aspect 
of the act of thought and the non-logical aspects of the object 
of scientific investigation (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:45). Does not 
Dooyeweerd then, fail to see the direct correspondence between 
subject (or thought) and object? Furthermore, does he not 
anchor his epistemology to the subject, thus creating a rather 
subject-ivist, or idealist type of approach, reminiscent of Kant 
and Husserl? This is how I understand Jaeger’s arguments on 
this topic.
The theoretical attitude of thought
Concerning the theoretical attitude of thought (in which an 
‘antithesis’ is established) I would say that the comparison 
proposed by Jaeger is not completely linear. While in the Logos 
approach the connection to be explained is the correspondence 
of thought and facts, in Dooyeweerd this is not the case. 




When Dooyeweerd speaks of antithesis, it is not an antithesis 
between subject and object but ‘only regarding the logical 
aspect of our act of thought as opposite to the non-logical 
aspects of reality’ (Dooyeweerd, 1948:31).4 His problem is the 
functioning of theoretical thought. The antithesis concerns the 
laborious process of theorizing, the effort which must be put in 
place to obtain theoretical knowledge. Subjects and objects may 
be thoroughly interwoven by the Logos, yet this does not mean 
that we have instant understanding of concrete reality and its 
laws. I think Dooyeweerd wanted to highlight the fatigue of 
scientific investigation, the sense of ‘opposition’ or resistance 
experienced in the process of analysis.
Now, Dooyeweerd’s account of theoretical thought can sound 
more or less convincing, plausible or accurate. But it does not 
crucially depend on the idea of opposition. For example, Strauss 
has re-phrased and simplified the whole theory by focusing 
on the idea of abstraction. (Modal) abstraction is the ‘heart’ of 
theoretical thought and it includes both analysis and synthesis 
(distinction and identification) as its two ‘legs’. Synthesis is 
then not the counterpart of opposition but of distinction (i.e. 
analysis -Strauss, 2009:13 ff., 361-368). In this re-construction 
of Dooyeweerd’s theory5  the theoretical ‘opposition’ between 
aspects is no longer necessary. Could this open new avenues of 
dialogue between Kuyperian scholars and circles? 
While keeping this hope, we need to return to my previous 
remark that Jaeger has not responded to a fundamental 
objection raised by Dooyeweerd (2012:83 ff.), that the Logos-
speculation implies a logic-ization of the created order. In 
fact, as the demiourgos (in Plato) shapes the un-created 
matter he follows a rational plan and has a rational purpose. 
The rational (logical) modality, therefore, is both the foundation 
and the goal of his creative activity (Ibid: 82). In Dooyeweerd’s 
language this means that the logical or rational aspect is 
absolutised, while the non-logical modalities are reduced to 
(sub-) modalities of the logical aspect. The implications of 
this idea were imported from Greek into Christian thinking. 
Even though in Christianity matter loses its divine attributes, 
creation still occurs according to God’s thoughts, its order is 
a rational order and the correspondence between thought and 
fact is logical. In this construction the risk, for the object, is to 
become not only open to logical analysis but logically qualified 
(i.e. fundamentally logical). The risk is also that the logical (and 
mathematical?) laws may be regarded as un-created (therefore 
as divine).
4 Dooyeweerd (1984, 1:52-55) argues that, in his transcendental 
critique, Kant committed precisely the fallacy of identifying the 
“transcendental logical cogito” (logical aspect) with the self that 
directs the cogito. As a result, the logical aspect of the act of thought is 
mistakenly assumed to be the agent performing the act of theoretical 
thought. Consequently, the true character of theoretical thought and 
its true starting point have remained hidden, and the autonomy of 
theoretical reason has been accepted as a truism. 
5 Strauss’ ‘reconstruction’ uses materials provided by Dooyeweerd 
himself, as the latter does sometimes characterize theoretical thought 
in terms of abstraction (cf. 1984, 2:472), though he may not necessarily 
abandon the idea of ‘opposition’.
Does this logicization affect Jaeger’s discourse as well? For 
example, is the fact that she is prepared to regard as synonyms 
terms like thoughts/words, linguistic/propositional and 
thought/discourse a first symptom of a logicization of the 
created order? She writes:
How should we compare facts and their interpretation (in 
thoughts or in words), given the fact that they are two very 
different categories? How can we establish a relationship 
between a linguistic (or propositional) and the factual element 
which is supposed to correspond to it? (...) The antinomy 
between fact and thought (or discourse) has no ground to exist 
(Jaeger, 2012:309).
What is the reason why she tends to associate words and 
thoughts so closely? Why should words, in the following step, 
be included in the pole of ‘thought’ (the counterpart of ‘facts’)? 
Are words fundamentally thoughts? Is the Word of the Prologue 
of John, also to be regarded as essentially rational and as the 
provider of the rational order of the cosmos?
Connecting subject and object: Dooyeweerd 
Whatever answer one may give to the previous questions, we 
have not yet clarified whether Dooyeweerd failed or not in 
connecting the human subject of knowledge to the objects, 
thus falling into idealism. In the previous section I have argued 
that Dooyeweerd’s ‘doctrine’ of theoretical thought does not 
necessarily imply a separation between knower and knowable. 
But this concerns only theoretical thought, it does not exclude 
that, in other areas or in other ways, Dooyeweerd creates 
excessive distance between subject and object. It is therefore 
necessary to analyse other parts of his philosophy.
To do this, I suggest that his understanding of the subject-
object relation is a strategic locus to begin with; more strategic, 
I would say, than his definitions of the term ‘truth’ (on which 
I will return below).  Basically, in Dooyeweerd’s ontology, what 
connect the subject to the object are the modal (universal) laws. 
Both subjects and objects are subjected to the law(s). In this 
sense I would say that Dooyeweerd’s epistemology is clarified 
by his ontology.
According to Dooyeweerd all entities function in all modal 
aspects, either as subjects or objects (to use Clouser’s language: 
passively or actively – Clouser, 2010:5). Cats function as subjects 
(i.e. actively) in the first six modalities: they have four paws 
(numeric aspect), when they are born they have a small size 
(spatial), then they learn to move around (kinematic), they get 
stronger (physical) and eventually they grow older (biotic) and 
their sight is less sharp at night (sensory). In the subsequent 
aspects cats function ‘passively’, as objects: they do not form 
concepts, but they can be analysed conceptually. They do not 
give names to their kittens but they get names. They do not sue 
anybody but they may belong to someone, thus functioning in 
the juridical modality. The modalities in which entities function 
as objects (passively) are always present, but they might not 
always be actualised. Actualisation occurs through a subject. 
For example, the photographs of the lunar environment 
provided by satellites allow our appreciation of the beauty of 




those landscapes. The potential for aesthetic admiration was 
always there, but now it is disclosed to subjects and by subjects. 
In other words the mentioned object-functions were latent but 
have been made patent (disclosed) by a subject. 
At this point it is necessary to avoid the (wrong) impression 
that, in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, the subject-object relation 
presents itself only in the logical or rational modal aspect. 
The subject-object relation presents itself in each and every 
modal aspect, and therefore is not only about knowledge. 
For example in the sensory aspect we can perceive an object 
or feel an emotion. In the physical aspect a subject can hit an 
object (for example kick a ball). In the ethical aspect a subject 
can love an object, for example one’s country or friends.6 This 
is made possible by the fact that objects and subjects function 
in the same modalities and are subjected to the same laws. 
Basically, then, we can say that objects and subjects are 
connected through the modalities in which they function. Troost 
(2012:96) observes that this is not an external or superficial type 
of link between entities that have little or nothing in common. 
On the contrary, it is an internal link, as entities are qualified by 
specific modalities.7 The world does not only contain subjects 
and objects (as philosophers of science often assume), but is an 
ordered cosmos, in which objects and subjects are subjected to 
the law-for creation, the structural modal order.
From this point of view, the very distinction between subject 
and object should be handled with care. Objects are never 
only objects: they are also subjects, at least in some 
dimensions (aspects) of life (cf. Hart’s remarkable analysis – 
1984:221 ff.). Not only: in some cases subjects too can be objects. 
Human beings can be logically analysed, for example, 
individually or as groups, from a biotic, psychic, historical 
or social point of view.  Finally, both subjects and objects are 
subject-ed to laws. 
 I find the following remark by Strauss particularly illuminating 
on the inclinations of reformational philosophy. He writes: 
‘it is an effect of the “subject-centredness” of modern 
philosophy (sometimes plainly designated as its subjectivism) 
that everything different from the human being is turned into 
an “object”’ (Strauss, 2009:346). With the last few remarks I 
have moved a bit away from Dooyeweerd, to have a look at some 
6 Another wrong impression could emerge in relation to the logical 
modality, namely that, according to Dooyeweerd, the subject-object 
relation is present only in naive experience. Such impression could 
be generated by the fact that Dooyeweerd says that we know an 
‘object’ only in naive thought, while in theoretical thinking we know 
a ‘Gegenstand’. It should be pointed out, however, that in theoretical 
thinking (i.e. when abstracting modalities) we do not lose sight of 
the object completely. The theoretical attitude of thought does not 
replace the naive attitude but, we might say, it is added to it. On this 
point Dooyeweerd might not have clarified his position sufficiently.
7 n his commentary on Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, Troost writes: ‘what 
we call the external world is so integrally interwoven with our human 
subjectivity, that the so-called subject-object split can be little more 
than a faulty mental construction, an erroneous fantasy (...)’ (Troost, 
2012:96).
other authors in the reformational tradition. I would like to 
continue this ‘stroll’ in the next section.
Connecting subject and object: the reformational 
tradition 
The relevance of the law is a theme which is particularly 
prominent in Jaeger’s writings (cf. Jaeger, 2008, 2010a, 2010b). 
It might be that, on closer examination, she could find in 
reformational philosophy a closer ally than she assumes 
at present.8 In this tradition, admittedly, scientific truth or 
objectivity is not simply the result of a correspondence between 
‘thought and facts’. However, Jaeger also gives alternative 
definitions of truth: as correspondence between a) ‘thought 
and world’ to be known (Ibid: 303) or between b) ‘thought and 
reality’ (2012:307). This raises a question: to what precisely 
should our theories correspond to, within the world or reality? 
The relativist, for example, tends to create a correspondence 
between theory and (the conceptions or definitions of) the 
human subject of knowledge. The subject too is part of ‘reality’ 
and part of ‘the world’. From a reformational point of view, 
Stafleu suggests that scientific truth or objectivity should be 
re-defined as ‘correspondence to the law’ (Stafleu, 1987:241). 
In his opinion this idea of ‘law-conformity’ is required by the 
‘reformed conception of the law’ (Ibid: 241). One may agree or 
not with this specific proposal, but it is still a ‘correspondence-
theory’ of knowledge and it is certainly not an idealist project, 
creating a gulf between knower and knowable. 
According to Hart (1984:82-83), who blends in his ontology 
the positions of Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven, the laws, 
the ‘nomic conditions’ are nothing else than the universals, 
that occupied such a central place in the discussions of 
Medieval philosophy. From an ontological point of view, this 
is equivalent to granting existence to the universals, which 
is quite far from any nominalist (idealist) conception. In this 
sense, reformational ontology could even be called ‘realist’. 
However, in my opinion, it constitutes an original position, 
an alternative inspired by the biblical revelation and rooted 
in the recognition of the law (cf. Hart, 1984:19 ff.). This ‘stroll’ 
through the reformational tradition should leave no doubts 
concerning the fact that it is not an idealist tradition.
Coming back to Dooyeweerd, there is one more difference 
between his and Jaeger’s attempts at connecting subject and 
object. For Jaeger the biblical worldview suggests that the 
two must be (are always) ‘tuned’ to each other. From there she 
might argue that this is more suitable to promote the scientific 
enterprise, that it is more in line with the Christian tradition 
and so forth. Yet she does not show philosophically that and 
how this tuning or correspondence occurs, or is possible. 
8 I have in mind for example reformational scholars like Van Riessen 
and Stafleu. According to Stafleu the reformed (and reformational) 
conception of the law is the one that prevailed since the Copernican 
‘revolution’, even though the secular versions of it do not recognise 
the Origin of laws (Stafleu, 1987:239-240). Van Riessen observes 
how the recent reluctance to recognise the law, in several academic 
disciplines, is often due, on the religious level, to a refusal to recognise 
a law-Giver (Van Riessen, 1992:55).




Dooyeweerd’s argumentation, by contrast, is not only a faith-
position but a philosophical explanation of the connection. 
Jaeger’s weakness on this point is the same characterizing 
Kuyper’s position. He too wanted to avoid idealism and he too 
appealed to the Logos to explain the correspondence between 
subject and object. It was a faith-inspired choice. On this point 
Klapwijk recently observes that while the appeal to the Logos-
doctrine can help understanding Kuyper’s intentions, it does 
not prove the point that the Father of neo-Calvinism wanted to 
argue (Klapwijk, 2013:25). From my side, I have to agree: a faith-
commitment is not yet a philosophical argumentation. 
Dooyeweerd’s definitions of ‘truth’
The critiques presented up to this point constitute only one 
leg of Jaeger’s argumentations, aiming at demonstrating the 
insufficient connection of subject and object in Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy. The other leg is constituted by her discussion of 
Dooyeweerd’s conception of the truth. However, the previous 
exploration of the subject-object relation presented by 
Dooyeweerd is relevant in this case too, and I believe it can 
again shed light on the discussion.
   I will omit a description of the ‘perspective structure of truth’, 
in relation to the ‘horizons of human experience’, as it is already 
well presented by Geertsema (2005:87-88, 92 ff.). I will rather 
focus on Jaeger’s (2012:308) impression that Dooyeweerd’s 
definitions of ‘truth’ are quite complex and such complexities 
cannot deliver the simple adequatio of thought and fact. Let us 
briefly examine a first definition of truth. 
According to its transcendental a priori dimension truth is: 
the accordance between the subjective a-priori knowledge 
enclosed by the temporal horizon, as expressed in a-priori 
judgements, and the a priori structural laws of human 
experience within this temporal horizon. The latter is open 
(as to its law- and subject-sides) to the light of the transcendent 
Truth in Christ (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 2:573). 
The above definition includes ‘both the pre-theoretical and 
theoretical dimensions of transcendental truth’ (Ibid: 573). 
A more specific definition of theoretical truth reads as follows.
The correspondence of the subjective a-priori meaning-
synthesis as to its intentional meaning with the modal 
structure of the ‘Gegenstand’ of theoretical thought. The modal 
‘Gegenstand’ is included in its all-sided coherence within the 
temporal horizon. This coherence exists both in its foundational 
and transcendental direction of time and is dependent on the 
transcendent fullness of the meaning of truth (Ibid: 572).
One may notice that in both definitions truth is regarded 
as a correspondence to modal dimensions (see the ‘a priori 
structural laws’ in the first quotation above and the ‘the modal 
structure of the Gegenstand’ in the second). In other words, the 
theme of ‘correspondence to the law’ emerges again and if the 
previous discussion is taken into account, it will become clear 
that no antithesis or disconnection between ‘subject and object’ 
is in view.   
Dooyeweerd’s epistemology is still one of correspondence. 
No one could insist that there are “undeniable states of affairs” 
as he does and fail to have a correspondence view. But he 
disagrees for example with Aquinas’ formulation and makes it 
a prime example of what he rejects. Thomas holds that truth 
is an agreement between “thought and being” and takes belief 
to be “intellectual assent”. Dooyeweerd (1984, 2:566) disagrees 
because Aquinas’ solution relates knowledge and truth only 
to the intellect, to the logical aspect of knowing. For him 
knowledge and belief take place in the heart not just in the 
intellect. In that way they involve the whole person in all his or 
her aspects (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 2:571)
Jaeger (2012:307, fn. 26) does report that she noticed Van 
Woudenberg’s (2005:116-117) observation that Dooyeweerd’s 
epistemology is still one of ‘correspondence’. Yet she did not 
pursue that direction to find out where it may lead. She quickly 
concluded that Dooyeweerd’s correspondence still does not 
‘create a direct contact between the human spirit and the world 
to know’ (Ibid: 308). The simple fact that Dooyeweerd does 
not fully conform to the ‘conception traditionelle’ (or even 
to a specific ‘formula’) is considered sufficient to declass his 
proposals. The fact that Dooyeweerd dares criticizing Bavink’s 
critical realism seems to be regarded as a proof that he does 
not create a direct contact between the knower and the world 
(2012:308, fn. 29). On this point, one has the impression that 
Jaeger is a bit too hasty in delivering her verdict.9 
In the next section we need to proceed to discuss her third 
allegation, concerning the relationship between Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy and Scripture. 
Philosophy and Scripture
Although recognising that Dooyeweerd wants to erect his 
epistemology on biblical grounds, Jaeger (2012:307, fn. 24) 
observes that he does not engage in a deep interaction with the 
biblical text. Admittedly, Dooyeweerd usually refers to broad 
biblical themes, rather than to specific verses. In his opinion 
Christian scholarship cannot be derived from a few texts and 
fragments, but is shaped especially by the biblical ground motif 
of creation, fall and redemption. 10 Ample use of biblical texts 
is sometimes even regarded with suspicion by Dooyeweerd. 
He once wrote about both Augustinian and Protestant 
9 Haste betrays Jaeger also in her footnote 29 (p. 308). In fact, in the 
passage of the New critique that she quotes there (i.e. Dooyeweerd 
1984, 1:560, fn.2) Dooyeweerd’s criticism is not directed (as she claims) 
to Herman Bavink (the reformed theologian) but to the German 
philosopher of nature Bernard Bavink. 
10 This is a somewhat ‘classical’ assessment of Dooyeweerd’s use of 
Scripture. Yet, should one start counting the instances when he quotes 
or refers to specific biblical texts, one might be quite surprised by the 
abundance of scriptural references. In this regard I would mention 
in particular his Roots of Western culture (1979). For Dooyeweerd 
however biblical quotations do not have the function of constituting 
or proving philosophical arguments but to show an agreement 
between the (philosophical or scientific) ‘building’ and its (religious) 
‘foundations’ (Dooyeweerd, 2012:50). 




Scholastics that ‘the more alien the foundation of their 
philosophy were to the Christian religion, the more copious (...) 
became their appeals to the biblical texts’ (2012:50). 
Jaeger’s conception is also derived from the Scriptures, both 
from particular texts and from general themes. As far as 
themes are concerned, her epistemology is based on the theme 
of Creation, in particular on ‘the distinction between creation 
and Creator’ 11 (Jaeger, 2012:306). And then of course she relies 
on the biblical texts dealing with the Logos. Now, a philosopher 
might not be the best candidate for exegetical discussions. 
Fortunately, in this case I can rely on a (Van Tilian) theologian 
(i.e. Oliphint, 2010:375-388) who objects to the use of the Logos-
doctrine in support of realist epistemology, and does so by way 
of biblical exegesis.
What type of knowledge does the Logos provide, according 
to the Prologue of the Gospel of John? Surely, it is a type of 
knowledge that all men share, knowledge that ‘enlightens all 
men’ (v. 9). Surely, it is knowledge that the Logos supplies since 
the creation of the world. According to Oliphint, however, it is 
not knowledge of ‘objects’ or facts. It is rather the knowledge 
of God, knowledge of the Logos himself (Oliphint, 2010:387). 
This is in line with the verses in Romans 1, teaching that God is 
known by all human beings, although this type of knowledge 
is then, so to speak, repressed or removed. Obviously, these 
findings constitute a non-marginal blow to the use of the Logos-
doctrine in support of (critical) realism. 
Yet is not the Logos also the rational order of the world? 
This was the understanding of the Greek readers of the Gospel 
of John, says Jaeger (2012:305), and the apostle would not have 
ignored this background understanding. He knew that by using 
the word Logos he would have induced his readers to think of 
the cosmic rationality, and he did not write anything to prevent 
or counteract that understanding. Should we not conclude 
that in the doctrine of the Logos the biblical meaning and 
the ‘natural’ understanding of its Greek readers contribute to 
a richer picture? Oliphint is rather clear-cut on this point: 
The true meaning of the term, however, is not to be gleamed 
from a synthesis of its historical use and its biblical use. God 
infallibly inspires the use and its true meaning in the writing of 
his own word (Oliphint, 2010:377, fn. 57). 
 The Logos, therefore, says Oliphint (2010:388-389) by 
supplying the knowledge of God, supplies what Bavink calls the 
principium essendi of epistemology, the source, foundation or 
11 In this regard, I find it difficult to follow some of Jaeger’s remarks 
concerning Dooyeweerd’s understanding of this biblical theme. Firstly 
she (2012:307) denounces an inclination ‘to conceive the distinction 
between Creator and creature in an antithetical mode’. Nevertheless, 
her further explanation of this idea in footnote 24 (Ibid: 307) speaks of 
Dooyeweerd’s insufficient distinction between Creator and (human) 
creature. Dooyeweerd’s distinction would be compromised by his 
conception of the supra-temporal heart (a divinisation of the self?). 
Nevertheless, in her footnote 25 (Ibid: 307) Jaeger refers to Acts 28, 17 
(‘for we are also His offspring’) to defend ‘the continuity between God 
and humanity’. 
cause of knowledge. This principium is necessary, says Oliphint, 
but not sufficient to legitimize or to erect a realist epistemology. 
All this brings Oliphint (Ibid:390) to the conclusion, which I 
gladly support, that the Christian scholar should stick to the 
principle of Sola Scriptura. Not in the sense that the Scripture is 
the only reference point for epistemology, but in the sense that 
the Scripture should have prominence over all other reference 
points shedding light on the matter. From this point of view, 
therefore, the Christian scholar, working in epistemology, 
should remain faithful primarily to the Scriptures, 12  not to 
realism or to any other ‘conception traditionelle’. 
This whole discussion is of course linked to the attitudes of 
accommodation and reformation in philosophy. Dooyeweerd 
(2012:46 ff., 51 ff.) distinguishes them sharply and regards 
Scholastic philosophy too as the result of a synthesis between 
Christian and pagan elements. Yet Jaeger too, from her 
position, regards Dooyeweerd’s philosophy as compromising 
with Humanist philosophy, in particular with the idealism of 
Kant and Husserl (Jaeger, 2012:310).
Dooyeweerd, Kant and Husserl
The fact that there are ‘analogies’ between the philosophies 
of Dooyeweerd, Kant and Husserl is not a secret. Already 
in a text dating back to 1962, for example, Knudsen 
(2009:327-329, original 1962), recognized and listed several 
areas of ‘analogy’. Dooyeweerd himself recognises the 
‘thousand ties’ (1984, 1:118) linking his philosophy to Kant in 
particular and to (contemporary) philosophy in general. And 
yet, right after this recognition, Dooyeweerd also claims that 
in its fundamental stance, reformational philosophy sets itself 
against Kantianism and secular philosophy in general. Knudsen 
too, after recognizing the analogies, proceeds to describing 
the substantial differences between the Dooyeweerdian and 
phenomenological approaches (Knudsen, 2009:329 ff.). 
I should perhaps supply a brief example based on the definitions 
of truth that were quoted above. There we find the term 
‘a priori’, which is typical of the philosophies of both Kant and 
Husserl. And yet, once one starts analysing Dooyeweerd’s use 
of this term, one discovers that a priori refers to what is given 
in creation. The a priori has a subject-side and a law-side. 
‘The subjective insight, expressing itself in judgments’ can 
be true or false. It is however dependent on structural laws 
(Dooyeweerd, 1984, 2:548). The basic difference with Kant and 
12 I am not always comfortable with the way Jaeger and Blocher deal 
with biblical verses or themes in connection with philosophical 
issues. A few years back Blocher (1986:6) managed to derive from the 
biblical distinction between God and creation, the idea that human 
beings reflect in their constitution a duality (body and soul) which is 
already present in ‘the entire reality’. In the concluding paragraph of 
her essay, Jaeger (2012:310) quotes Acts 17, 28 (‘in Him we have our life, 
movement and being’). If this is intended to counteract Dooyeweerd’s 
well-known argument that we should distinguish between God 
as ‘being’ and creation as ‘meaning’, I think the attempt is rather 
biblicistic. In any case, Dooyeweerd does not say that creatures have 
no ‘being’, but that ‘meaning is the creaturely mode of being’ (see 
1984, 1:4).




Husserl is that for Dooyeweerd the subject is not the a priori 
foundation of knowledge (Geertsema, 2005:95).
Once again, it would be helpful to place Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy in the broader context of reformational philosophy. 
It would then appear quite clearly that, since its beginnings, this 
movement has pointed out that the very roots of phenomenology 
and Kantianism are incompatible with an integral Christian 
approach. One might think for example of the text Creation, 
revelation and philosophy by Mekkes (2010, orig. 1961) or The 
rise and development of the phenomenological movement 
by Van der Hoeven (1964).13 Is it plausible to imagine that 
Dooyeweerd’s attitude (sympathetic towards Kantianism and 
phenomenology – according to Jaeger) resulted in such sharp 
oppositions in the works of so many reformational authors? 
Would this not have raised at least some perplexities within 
this school? How come that Dooyeweerd himself (1984,2:487) 
defined phenomenology as “the most dangerous adversary” 
among the schools of humanist philosophy?
It would be equally helpful to know in which area or in which 
sense, according to Jaeger, Dooyeweerd’s compromise with 
‘idealism’14 took place. Unfortunately, she does not clarify 
precisely how or where such a questionable synthesis occurred. 
In the absence of this information, perhaps my approach should 
be more ‘presuppositional’, in the sense of focusing on the 
assumptions of Jaeger’s discourse. In other words, one should 
ask questions like: is it fair for Jaeger, to accuse Dooyeweerd 
of compromise, after effectuating her own synthesis with 
(one may even say her ‘full immersion’ in) the Scholastic 
tradition?
 Is it fair to accuse Dooyeweerd of accommodation after showing 
that accommodation is legitimised by the Bible itself? Is not her 
understanding of the Logos the result of a synthesis between the 
biblical and the Greek understanding of this idea? Furthermore, 
she approves Blocher’s thesis that the epistle to the Hebrews 
‘shows some affinities with the synthesis that Philo created 
between the Torah and Platonism’ (Jaeger, 2012:305). In the 
same vein, she takes Paul’s reference to the pagan poet Aratos 
(Acts 17, 28) to prove that ‘the biblical authors are not afraid 
of corrupting the purity of their teaching by resorting to the 
categories utilised by Greek philosophers’ (Jaeger, 2012:307). 
13  Further examples from subsequent decades are constituted by Bong-
ho Son (1972), Strauss (1982), Kuk-won Shin (1994).
14 The only clue given by Jaeger (Ibid: 310) about Dooyeweerd’s “idealism” 
is that according to him a ‘creature is nothing in itself, if isolated 
from the other creatures and especially from its transcendent Origin’ 
(Dooyeweerd, 1959:17). Now, in this famous passage Dooyeweerd is 
speaking of the supra-temporal self, not of all ‘creatures’. Yet even 
admitting that rocks and plants could not exist apart from their 
Origin, from other creatures or from aspects other than the physical 
and biotic, this does not reduce them to sensations or make them 
mind-dependent in an idealist sense. Perhaps Jaeger thinks that the 
modal aspects are only in our minds. But Dooyeweerd (1984, 2:49-
50) defines them as aspects ‘of reality’ or ‘of experience’ (cf. Strauss, 
2006:68). Once this is understood, I think it will be easily admitted 
that his ontology may not be regarded as idealistic.
After such declarations, what complaints could one address to 
Dooyeweerd, concerning syntheses or compromises? 
One might consider that, probably, from Jaeger’s point of view, 
joining an established Christian tradition is a much more 
legitimate choice than joining secular traditions (like those 
initiated by Kant and Husserl). Yet this provides an opportunity 
to say that the Scholastic tradition in philosophy is deeply 
rooted in the pagan tradition. In certain respects, Scholasticism 
is as pagan as Humanism! Humanism too can be regarded as 
a re-elaboration of Christian and biblical themes. Humanism is 
not simply paganism: it passed through centuries of (synthesis-) 
Christianity, and it could be regarded as a by-product of 
Christianity itself. At least, this was Klapwijk’s thesis, reflecting 
Hegel’s famous dictum, according to which Western culture 
has been shaped in the shadow of Christianity (Klapwijk, 
1987:105 ff.).15 But this is only half of an integral (may I say: 
an Evangelical) point of view: it needs to be supplemented by the 
recognition that both Scholasticism and Humanism, although 
influenced by Christianity to an extent, are immensely indebted 
to pre-Christian thought.
Of course this doesn’t mean that everything in those traditions 
must simply be rejected or that Christians should say the 
opposite of what they say. Yet my impression is that Jaeger has 
not paid sufficient attention to Dooyeweerd when he points out 
the threat that Scholastic philosophy poses to integral Christian 
scholarship. Admittedly, in Jaeger’s essay one does find 
arguments showing that she recognises and is aware of these 
problems. Unfortunately, those arguments are accompanied by 
others, pointing towards a different direction. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The dialogue between Jaeger and Dooyeweerd is a precious 
conversation on the very foundations of Christian science and 
scholarship. It is also part of a long standing dialogue between 
the different branches of the Kuyperian tradition. In some cases 
the distance between these circles might remain substantial, 
yet the attempts at dialogue and mutual understanding are 
necessary, if we want to support truly Christian scholarship. 
This exercise requires self-examination as well. 
In some reformed circles, there is an established tradition of 
placing Dooyeweerd’s philosophy on a shelf after briefly paying 
lip-service to it. Usually, what is accepted from his philosophy is 
something that is already available from Kuyper, Van Til or some 
other theologian. From that shelf, reformational philosophy 
can be “exhibited” to interested visitors and outsiders, but for 
the rest it is hardly mentioned or used anymore. On the basis 
(or rather: with the pretext) of this or that alleged inadequacy, 
this philosophy stemming from the Reformation is basically 
ignored. Remarkably, a whole host of para-Christian, or overtly 
secular approaches are preferred to it (cf. Blocher, 2010:227; 
Frame, 1987:146, 318). 
15 ‘I would even defend the thesis’, writes Klapwijk, ‘that practically 
the whole of modern humanistic philosophy derives from a 
transformation of the Christian inheritance’ (Klapwijk, 1987:105-106).




This article recommends a re-evaluation of several themes 
of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy as a Reformed and Evangelical 
philosophy. It is my impression that Jaeger’s evaluation of 
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy could be more positive and several of 
her critiques should be re-considered. Admittedly, this exercise 
would imply some self-critique as well. But it would lead to a 
(re-)discovery of many and valuable resources, not only in 
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy but in the reformational tradition as 
well.
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